The Burden on Society from Eleventh-Hour  Citizen Petitions  Filed to Slow Generic Drugs by Robin, Feldman
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law 
Maryland Law Review Online 
2020 
The Burden on Society from Eleventh-Hour "Citizen Petitions" 
Filed to Slow Generic Drugs 
Feldman Robin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/endnotes 
 Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robin Feldman, The Burden on Society from Eleventh-Hour “Citizen Petitions” Filed to Slow Generic Drugs, 
79 Md. L. Rev. Online 1 (2020). 
This Articles from Volume 79 is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review Online by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 
 1 
THE BURDEN ON SOCIETY FROM ELEVENTH-HOUR “CITIZEN 
PETITIONS” FILED TO SLOW GENERIC DRUGS 
ROBIN FELDMAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The Food and Drug Administration’s citizen petition process  
provides an avenue for ordinary citizens to raise concerns and 
participate in the regulatory process.  Abuse of that process has 
been documented as an example of the legal maneuvering used by 
pharmaceutical companies to protect their brand-name drug 
revenue streams from the introduction of low-cost generics.  To 
date, the financial cost to society of these delays has not been 
calculated in the literature, which likely hinders the push for 
policy solutions.  Drawing from a previously published data set 
on 249 citizen petitions, this Article will identify four petitions 
that were highly likely to have been the final obstacle to a generic 
drug entering the market.  Specifically, the petitions were denied; 
the FDA approved the generics within one business day of 
denying the petitions; and the generics came to market within one 
week of the FDA’s approval, signaling that the petitions were the 
final obstacle standing in the way of the generic’s entry to 
market.  Using these four dubious citizen petitions, this Article 
will find that the total financial cost to society from citizen 
petition delays was $1.9 billion or $3.6 million per day.1  The 
total financial cost to government-provided insurance programs 
in the same period was roughly $782 million.2  This Article will 
employ a conservative methodology (choosing only four petitions 
that meet the criteria of “but for” this citizen petition, the generic 
would have gone to market).  Thus, the estimates are likely low.  
Citizen petitions that contributed to a generic delay as one of 
many tactics or for which there was not sufficient volume and 
usage information were eliminated from consideration in this 
estimate. 
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 1.  See infra Section I.B. 
 2.  See infra Section I.B.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Abuse of the citizen petition process is one tactic in a large repertoire 
of legal maneuvering used by pharmaceutical companies to protect their 
brand-name drug revenue streams from the introduction of low-cost generic 
equivalents.  The citizen petition process at the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) can be traced back to a movement in the 1970s to 
provide opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in the regulatory 
agency decision-making process.3  In theory, citizen petitions should 
provide a method for all voices to be heard, and the process is intended for 
engaged citizens and scientists to voice concerns about food, drugs, and 
FDA regulations.  In practice, pharmaceutical companies frequently use the 
system to file baseless citizen petitions—that are subsequently denied by 
the FDA—in the hopes of delaying generic drugs from reaching the market.  
In some years, as many as one in five citizen petitions filed at the FDA on 
any topic (including tobacco, food, and dietary supplements) had the 
potential to delay the entry of a generic drug.4  And the trend is growing.5 
Often companies file their citizen petition in the months right before 
their generic competitors’ approval is anticipated.  In the vast majority of 
cases, the FDA denies these petitions.6  Yet, the drug companies’ motives 
are easy to identify: delaying a lower-priced generic from entering the 
market for even ninety days can earn the companies hundreds of millions of 
dollars of revenue, making their bogus citizen petitions worth their while.7 
                                                          
 3.  See Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A 
Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s 
Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139 
(2001) (describing the development of citizen participation in federal agency practice); see also 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012 & Supp. III 2015) (mandating that federal 
agencies allow the public to petition to change, amend, or repeal an agency rule). 
 4.  Robin Feldman, Evan Frondorf, Andrew K. Cordova  & Connie Wang, Empirical 
Evidence of Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 
40 (2017) (examining empirical evidence suggesting the citizen petition process has “become a 
key avenue for strategic behavior by pharmaceutical companies to delay” the entry of generic 
competition). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 249–52 (2012); Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: 
Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 333 (2016) (finding that the FDA 
denied 81% of generic-related petitions between 2001 and 2010 and 92% of petitions between 
2011 and 2015, with denial rates as high as 92% in 2005, 96% in 2012, and even 100% in 2015). 
 7.  For example, in 2014, Sovaldi, a hepatitis C drug manufactured by Gilead, earned $7.9 
billion in sales, making it the top-earning drug in the United States.  At that rate, three additional 
months of sales would be worth $1.98 billion.  During that same year, Pfizer’s Nexium earned 
$5.9 billion in revenue, meaning that three additional months of sales would amount to $1.48 
billion.  See Lacie Glover, Here are the Top-Selling Drugs in the US, TIME (June 26, 2015),  
https://money.com/money/3938166/top-selling-drugs-sovaldi-abilify-
humira/?xid=soc_socialflow_twitter_money (identifying revenue for Pfizer’s Nexium drug). 
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Protecting the availability of low-cost generic drugs matters to the 
American public.  Affordable generic drugs, in addition to being critical to 
public health, translate into huge savings for the American public and 
government-funded insurance programs.8  The availability of a generic 
equivalent can reduce the price of a prescription drug significantly9; more 
than three-quarters of prescriptions are now filled with their generic 
equivalents.10  Thus, bringing generics to market is an essential part of 
controlling drug costs. 
Despite the documented abuse of the citizen petition system,11 the cost 
to society of these delays has not been calculated, which may hinder the 
push for policy solutions.  Following the analytic techniques that Congress 
uses for estimating the likely impact of reform, this Article will identify a 
set of citizen petitions that could be described as the sole, “but for” cause of 
keeping a particular generic out of the market.12  It will use the criteria that 
the petition was denied; the FDA approved the generic within one business 
day of denying the petition; and the generic came to market within one 
week of the FDA’s approval, signaling that the petition was the final 
obstacle standing in the way of the generic’s entry to market. 
Drawing from a previously published data set of 249 citizen 
petitions,13 this Article will analyze four petitions from a two-year period 
that are highly likely to have been the final obstacle to a generic drug 
entering the market, and for which sufficient volume and usage data exist.  
Using these four dubious citizen petitions, this Article will show that the 
total financial cost to society of citizen petition delays was $1.9 billion—
which equals roughly $3.6 million per day.14  Additionally, this Article will 
find that the total financial cost to government-provided insurance programs 
in the same period was roughly $782 million.15  Due to the conservative 
methodology employed16 (choosing only petitions that met the criteria of 
                                                          
 8.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS 
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 4 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-12-371r (reviewing 
available literature on the savings from generic drug usage, including three groups of studies).  
Two groups of studies found large cost-savings for the American public including $1 trillion over 
eleven years.  Id.  A third group of studies had more mixed results on savings because it 
considered healthcare savings more generally rather than drug spending exclusively.  Id. 
 9.  ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES 
AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 20–24 (2017). 
 10.  Id. at 22. 
 11.  Robin Feldman & Connie Wang, A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray—Delaying 
Competition from Generic Drugs, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499–1501 (2017). 
 12.  See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2374, STOP STALLING ACT 1 
(2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/hr2374.pdf (following the “but for” approach). 
 13.  For details on the methodology of the assembly and analysis of the larger data set, see 
Feldman & Wang, supra note 11, at 1499; see also Feldman et al., supra note 4, at 39. 
 14.  See infra Section I.B. 
 15.  See infra Section I.B. 
 16.  See infra Part I. 
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“but for” this citizen petition the generic would have gone to market), the 
estimates are likely low.  Citizen petitions that contributed to a generic’s 
delay to market as one of multiple tactics or for which there was not 
sufficient volume and usage information were eliminated from 
consideration in this estimate. 
This is an extraordinarily narrow method of identifying citizen 
petitions that contribute to generic drug delays.  This approach significantly 
underestimates the financial impact when pharmaceutical companies misuse 
the regulatory system by filing baseless citizen petitions.  By counting 
financial costs only associated with citizen petitions that stand alone during 
the twelve-year period rather than when they may be contributing to the 
delay as part of an arsenal of tactics, the total cost is undoubtedly 
underestimated.  Moreover, this Article does not include in the calculation 
any costs to public health that may come from patients foregoing 
medication due to the lack of a lower cost generic alternative.  Nonetheless, 
these delays bring substantial and sobering costs. 
Moreover, these assessments focus solely on the financial cost to the 
American public.  Drug costs also affect the health and well-being of 
citizens directly, regardless of whether they have insurance.  According to 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, nearly one-quarter of Americans said their 
family chose not to fill at least one prescription within the last year.17  In 
families where members were in poor or fair health, those numbers were 
even higher.18  The cost of these delays to the public’s health and well-
being is not calculated in the total cost, underscoring that these are 
conservative estimates.  The methodology and results for assessing the 
financial cost to the American public of citizen petition delays are presented 
below.19 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  Identifying Citizen Petitions Designed to Delay Generic Drugs to 
Market 
This Article analyzes the historic financial cost to society because of 
FDA citizen petitions filed at the last hour to delay pharmaceutical 
competition.  Given the extensive tactics that pharmaceutical companies 
regularly use to thwart competition from generic drugs, only those citizen 
petitions that were most likely the principal cause delaying generic entry at 
that point in time were identified.  In other words, the calculations included 
                                                          
 17.  Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth & Mollyann Brodie, Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 
2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-
health-tracking-poll-august-2015/. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See infra Part I.A. (explaining the methodology of the paper); infra Section I.B. 
(discussing the results of the calculation). 
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only those citizen petitions whose timing suggests they were the final 
obstacle standing in the way of generic approval.  This Article also only 
includes citizen petitions for which sufficiently robust volume and price 
information were available. 
This analysis first required examination of citizen petition data that 
was previously assembled and published on the 249 citizen petitions filed at 
the FDA during the twelve-year period from 2000 to 2012 with the 
potential to delay generic competition.  Additional criteria were established 
to select the most relevant citizen petitions. 
Specifically, only those citizen petitions that were filed by a 
pharmaceutical company within six months of their competing generic 
drug’s approval were examined.  This six-month window was chosen 
because in the years between 2007 and 2012, federal law required that the 
FDA respond to citizen petitions within 180 days (roughly six months).20  
Prior to that time, there was no limit on the FDA’s response time, and a 
citizen petition could delay generic entry for longer than six months.21  
Thus, only petitions filed within six months of when the generic was 
approved were examined on the theory that those cases most likely 
represented petitions filed as a last-ditch effort to delay generic competition 
during the relevant study period. 
This supposition is reinforced by the fact that on average for approved 
generics, the FDA takes four years from the time the generic drug company 
files its application to the time when the drug is approved.22  In other words, 
the brand-name drug companies in these cases did not appear to be rushing 
to the FDA to express urgent concerns about a generic applicant but rather 
they waited until they exhausted other avenues and filed the petitions as a 
last-ditch effort. 
Within the subset of petitions filed within six months of approval, the 
data set was further narrowed to include only those petitions for which: 
1. The FDA approved the generic within one business day of denying 
the citizen petition, signaling the likelihood that the petition was 
baseless; and 
2. The generic came to market within one week of the FDA’s 
approval, signaling the likelihood that the petition was the final 
obstacle standing in the way of the generic’s entry to market.23 
                                                          
 20.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (2012 & Supp. III 2015). 
 21.  Congress subsequently reduced the time to 150 days.  See Food and Drug Administration 
Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  For an explanation of the generic drug approval process, see 
FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 9, at 26–33. 
 22.  Feldman et al., supra note 4, at 72, 74 (calculating the average approval time for generic 
applications in the data set as 16.5 quarters—slightly over four years). 
 23.  Despite the preparation that happens ahead of FDA approval, it is assumed that it can 
take a little more effort for a generic company to officially enter the market than it takes for the 
FDA to file the document granting approval.  Thus, a window of one week for getting to market 
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Together, these criteria suggest the citizen petitions were most likely the 
cause delaying generic entry at that point, and that “but for” the citizen 
petitions, the generics would have entered the market. 
For example, a case in which the FDA denied the petition after the 
generic application was approved and after the generic entered the market 
was removed from consideration.  Under those circumstances, the petition 
filing did not block the generic from approval and subsequent market entry, 
although the petition could have contributed to the delay process in some 
manner.24 
With the established criteria in place, particular attention was paid to 
two years—2008 and 2012—each of which contained two citizen petitions 
that met the criteria.  The four petitions related to a drug for treating 
depression, two drugs for treating high blood pressure, and one drug for 
treating muscle spasms occurring from multiple sclerosis and spinal cord 
injury, with the drug for depression having the highest cost impact of the 
group.25  Exhibit 2 identifies the four drugs and shows the dates the 
generics filed their application for approval to enter the market (which is 
known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application or “ANDA”),26 the dates 
the brand-name drug companies filed their citizen petitions, the date of the 
FDA’s denial, and the length of the delay to the generic drugs entering the 
market.  For the four citizen petitions that met the criteria, the total delay to 
getting lower-cost generic drugs to market was 521 days. 
                                                          
was chosen, although some generics do, indeed, get to market within one or two days of FDA 
approval.  In order to find the market entry date, this Article used DrugBank, a free and publicly 
accessible database with relevant pharmaceutical drug information, including market entry date.  
See generally About DrugBank, DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/about (last visited Jan. 20, 
2020).  The market entry data was then cross referenced with the FDA Approval data found on the 
FDA’s website.  See Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).  
 24.  See infra text accompanying notes 25–30 (explaining that when a citizen petition is part 
of a series of delaying tactics, each tactic may contribute to the delay to some extent, even if the 
particular tactic is not the last straw before approval). 
 25.  Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2007-P-0123-0002 (Nov. 30, 
2007), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0123-0002 (filed by the makers of 
Plendil (active ingredient: felodipine)); King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-
2008-P-0304-0001 (May 19, 2008), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2008-P-
0304-0001(filed by the makers of Altace (active ingredient: ramipril)); AstraZeneca LP Citizen 
Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0662-0001 (Sept. 9, 2011), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0662-0001 (filed by the makers of 
Seroquel (active ingredient: quetiapine fumarate)); and Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. Citizen Petition, 
No. FDA-2011-P-0654-0001 (Sept. 7, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2011-P-0654-0001(filed by the makers of Zanaflex (active ingredient: tizanidine hydrochloride)).  
These petitions were found by using Regulations.gov, which is a government-maintained website 
allowing third parties to access certain regulation documents, including filed citizen petitions.  
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
 26.  For a discussion of the requirements for filing an ANDA along with the ANDA process, 
see FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 9, at 26–33 (describing ANDAs and the role they play in 
the generic approval process). 
2020] THE BURDEN ON SOCIETY 7 
One must emphasize that this approach is an extraordinarily narrow 
method of identifying the citizen petitions that contribute to delays and one 
that significantly underestimates the financial impact when companies 
abuse the regulatory system by filing improper citizen petitions.  An 
improper citizen petition is often one tactic in an arsenal of delay tactics a 
brand can launch against a generic applicant.  For example, a generic 
company needs samples of the original drug to prove to the FDA that the 
generic and brand are bioequivalent.  Brand companies can delay a 
generic’s application by refusing to provide appropriate samples.27  
Similarly, when a drug is subject to a safety plan related to labelling or 
distribution, for example, the FDA will not approve the generic until the 
companies agree on a plan.  As long as the parties do not reach an 
agreement, the brand remains on the market and the generic is left out in the 
cold.28  Thus, brand companies have an incentive to delay or create 
unreasonable demands in the cooperation discussions. 
Brand companies also can expand their definition of what a patent 
covers by adding new “use codes” to the FDA records.  These add-on codes 
are not reviewed by the FDA, and a generic company has to engage in 
expensive litigation to challenge the addition.29  The tactics abound, and 
each tactic plays a role in the delay.  By counting costs only when the 
citizen petition stands alone, rather than when the citizen petition may be 
contributing to the delay as part of many tactics, the calculation does not 
encompass the full extent to which improper citizen petitions are adversely 
affecting society.  Other citizen petitions not included in this estimate may 
                                                          
 27.  For a discussion of two cases regarding a brand denying samples, see id. at 81–83 
(discussing Actelion Pharm. LTD v. Apotex Inc., No. 12-5743, 2013 WL 5524078 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 
2013)) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-cv-2094, 2014 WL 12810322 
(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2014) (showing that Celgene purposefully refused to provide samples to a 
generic competitor without any “legitimate business reasons” for delaying)); see also Kat Greene, 
Actelion Settles Row over Giving Drugs to Generic Makers, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/514434/actelion-settles-row-over-giving-drugs-to-generics-
makers (explaining Actelion). 
 28.  Cf. In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. 
Supp. 3d 665, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (outlining accusations by the generic that the brand demanding 
“unnecessary, unprecedented and unreasonable” conditions before cooperating constituted 
anticompetitive conduct); FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 9, at 87–90 (discussing 
unsuccessful labelling and monitoring discussions between the brand maker of Suboxone, the 
opioid addiction treatment drug, and the generic applicant);  see also CREATES Act: Ending 
Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Drug Price Competition: Hearing on 
S.3056 Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Robin Feldman, Arthur J. Goldberg 
Distinguished Professor of Law at U.C. Hastings Law), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-creates-act-ending-regulatory-abuse-protecting-
consumers-and-ensuring-drug-price-competition (discussing such tactics). 
 29.  See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE 
GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 83–84 (2019) (describing the “use code” tactic and 
documenting a rise in the addition of use codes by pharmaceutical companies). 
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contribute to some specific time-portion of the delay or to some degree of 
the delay overall. 
For example, a generic company must fight off each tactic—
responding to accusations raised in citizen petitions, filing court actions, 
and countering other moves such as refusals to transfer samples.30  No 
company has endless resources and mindshare such that it can respond to 
all tactics at the same time.  Each tactic contributes to the time it takes the 
company to respond to the full range of assaults.  Thus, each tactic accounts 
for some time-portion of the delay that results from the full range of tactics. 
Similarly, to the extent that each tactic plays a role in slowing down 
the generic company, each contributes to the delay in some degree, even if 
one could not identify a specific period of time attributable to that tactic.  In 
other words, if a generic drug company spends one year responding to a 
range of assaults, each assault is responsible for some degree of the delay, 
even if the company was responding to multiple assaults at any given 
moment.31  Nevertheless, this Article chooses to focus on a group of four 
citizen petitions in the data that would satisfy a very narrow set of criteria 
and provide a conservative calculation of societal cost. 
B.  Measuring the Financial Cost Impact of Citizen Petition Delays 
 
As noted in the previous section,32 in narrowing the twelve-year data 
set to look for those citizen petitions that would meet the “but for” criteria, 
the set of citizen petitions was also limited to those petitions related to 
drugs for which sufficient price and volume information were available.  
This first required removing instances where multiple and distinct citizen 
petitions were filed against the same drug in order to avoid duplicating cost 
estimate calculations for the same drug.  Then the additional citizen 
petitions associated with the same drug were eliminated. 
In order to find critical drug pricing and volume information, the 
dataset was cross-referenced with other sources.  In the citizen petition 
dataset, a generic drug was represented by its ANDA number,33 and the 
associated brand drug was represented by its New Drug Application 
                                                          
 30.  See, e.g., FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 9, at 80–82 (describing the Actelion case, 
in which a brand company refused to provide samples of drugs to a potential generic company, 
preventing the generic from filing an application for FDA approval). 
 31.  From a long-term perspective, potential generics must factor in the need to fend off these 
assaults in deciding whether to try to develop a generic product.  Although more difficult to 
quantify, these disincentives also generate societal costs. 
 32.  See supra Section I.A. 
 33.  See Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-application-anda (explaining 
ANDAs and their function) (last updated May 22, 2019). 
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(“NDA”) number.34  The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) provided drug pricing and volume information from their drug 
event data.35  However, drugs are represented in the CMS data only by 
National Drug Code (“NDC”).36  Therefore, the analysis required a dataset 
that would link NDA numbers to NDCs.37  After the NDA numbers were 
linked to NDCs, citizen petitions that did not have active NDCs during the 
delay period were filtered out.38  In other words, these NDCs were not 
available in the market during the delay period and thus could not be 
considered.  For other NDCs, there was an absence of complete price and 
volume information.  In sum, the two years and four citizen petitions that 
were utilized met not only the “but for” filter described above, but also the 
active NDC code, price, and volume criteria. 
To determine the cost of delay across the relevant period, the cost of 
the drug without the generic in the market was compared to the cost of the 
generic once it reached the market.  The percentage of generic market 
penetration, that is, the proportion of generics sold out of the total drug 
sales of each individual drug, was also factored in.  Then, by looking at the 
volume of the drug, the excess amount that society spent on sales of the 
drug during the delay period was determined.  In mathematical terms, the 
financial cost to society was calculated for each of the four drugs as 
follows: 
Financial Cost to Society = Volume * Generic Portion of the 
Market * Cost Difference * United States Population 
 
The estimated net price of the branded drug was obtained from 
information drawn from Medicare Part D drug event data purchased from 
CMS.  A Medicare Part D drug event occurs each time a patient purchases 
medication from a pharmacy through a doctor’s prescription.  The drug 
                                                          
 34.  See New Drug Application (NDA), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-application-nda (explaining NDAs and 
their function) (last updated June 10, 2019). 
 35.  CMS is part of the Department of Health and Human Services.  See About CMS, U.S. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
 36.  See National Drug Code Directory, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/national-drug-code-directory 
(explaining NDCs and their function) (last updated Nov. 18, 2019).  
 37.  This Article uses an FDA dataset that includes NDCs and their associated NDA numbers.  
See NSDE, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/industry/structured-product-labeling-
resources/nsde (last updated Mar. 27, 2018). 
 38.  All further mentions of the “delay period” refer to the time between the date of the citizen 
petition filing and the date of the generic approval—which could be any number of days up to 180 
days (or six months). 
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event data covers a cohort of just under one million patients.39  The list 
price of the brand drug during pendency of the citizen petition could be 
determined from the data, after which the average manufacturer rebate in 
that year was applied to determine the net price of the branded drug.  The 
average manufacturer rebate was found using the annual rebate percentages 
published by the CMS Medical Trustees report adjusted to reflect rebate 
percentages for branded drugs only.40  For the year 2012, for example, the 
average manufacturer rebate was sixteen percent.41  CMS drug event data 
was also used to calculate the average price of the generic drug in the first 
year after approval. 
Next, a figure for the volume of the drug used during the delay period 
was established by calculating the number of times a particular drug was 
dispensed to patients in the cohort during the delay period.  Given that the 
CMS data represents just under one million patients, the volume figure was 
multiplied by a factor of: total American population divided by one 
million.42 
In this manner, cost and volume figures for patients across the nation 
as a whole could be estimated.  Applying those figures to the delay period, 
the cost to society of these four baseless citizen petitions is estimated at 
$1.9 billion.  Given that the estimation in Exhibit 2 for the total number of 
days of delay was 521, this means the cost per day to American citizens of 
these baseless delay tactics is $3.6 million. 
To get a sense of how much the government—and also American 
taxpayers—are losing from these bogus citizen petitions, the cost to 
government-provided insurance programs in the two-year period was 
                                                          
 39.  For an extensive description of Medicare, CMS data files, and the purchase of CMS Part 
D data, see Robin Feldman, The Devil Is in the Tiers, 28–29 (U.C. Hastings Law Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 379, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3490065. 
 40.  BDS. OF TRS. FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2017 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND 
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 143 (2017) (expressing the average 
manufacturer rebates as a percentage of total drug costs, across all prescription drugs).  The report 
notes that “[g]eneric drugs . . . typically do not carry manufacturer rebates.  Many brand-name 
prescription drugs carry substantial rebates.”  Id. at 143 n.66. 
 41.  The annual rebate percentages found in the CMS Medical Trustees report were adjusted 
to reflect rebate percentages for only branded drugs as follows: 2006 (10.6%), 2007 (12.0%), 2008 
(13.3%), 2009 (14.4%), 2010 (14.7%), 2011 (14.7%), 2012 (16.0%), 2013 (17.9%), 2014 (19.3%), 
and 2015 (24.2%).  Id. at 143. 
 42.  U.S. Population by Year, MULTPL.COM, https://www.multpl.com/united-states-
population/table/by-year (last visited June 7, 2019).  The numbers from this website are sourced 
from the United States Census Bureau.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2020).  This methodology assumes the usage of the drug among the Medicare 
population is comparable to the usage of the drug among the national patient population as a 
whole.  This methodology also assumes drug companies provide rebates to private insurers at a 
percentage comparable to the rebates provided to Medicare Part D plans.  Other limitations of 
these results include the small sample size, such that individual petitions in the study might not be 
representative of the whole, and the fact that information may not be the same in years outside of 
the period examined. 
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estimated at roughly $782 million.  This number was calculated by 
estimating that 41.3% of all claims during the two-year period were covered 
by government-provided insurance.  The 2017 Census data was used to 
estimate the percentage of government-provided insurance plans including 
Medicaid (19.3%), Medicare (17.2%), and military coverage (4.8%).43 
Most important, this analysis utilized citizen petition data that had 
been painstakingly assembled from archived information, some of which is 
no longer available from the FDA in any form or has never been 
available.44  Techniques were developed for triangulating information to 
pinpoint the time periods for various activities related to FDA filings.45 
Notably, another estimate that calculates the costs of the delays caused 
by dubious citizen petitions was done by the Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) in anticipation of HR 2374, a bill aimed at curbing citizen petition 
abuse.  The CBO estimate suggested a savings to the government of $117 
million over the ten-year period of 2019 to 2029 affecting $1–2 billion in 
sales over a decade.46  The CBO noted “uncertainty” in their estimate, due 
in part to the difficulty in predicting the volume of brand-name sales 
impacted by generic drugs.47  Given the large volume of drug business cited 
above,48 the access to drug volume and use data, and the database of citizen 
petition information utilized in this Article, the findings of this Article can 
considerably reduce that uncertainty.  Thus, this Article provides a more 
complete picture, as well as one that helps assess the savings to American 
consumers, rather than simply the savings to government programs.  The 
analysis and estimates presented in this Article are offered to help facilitate 
discussion of this critical issue. 
CONCLUSION 
 The United States government established the citizen petition process 
to allow engaged citizens and scientists to file concerns about the safety and 
regulation of drugs coming to the market.  Rather than providing an active 
sounding board for public health and safety issues, the process is dominated 
by pharmaceutical companies seeking to delay competition from generic 
drug equivalents.  The financial cost to the American public of only four 
citizen petitions that were identified as having a high likelihood of being the 
sole, final cause of delay to market is $1.9 billion or an average of $3.6 
                                                          
 43.  See Edward R. Berchick, Emily Hood & Jessica C. Barnett,  Health Insurance Coverage 
in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1–2 (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-264.pdf. 
 44.  Feldman & Wang, supra note 11, at 1499–1501. 
 45.  See Feldman et. al., supra note 4, at 64–70 (describing the methodology). 
 46.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 2.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (discussing the volume calculations used 
in this Article). 
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million per day.  The cost to government-provided insurance programs in 
the two-year period is roughly $782 million.  These numbers are highly 
conservative and the actual cost to society is likely significantly higher.  
Moreover, these estimates do not account for the costs to public health and 
well-being due to the lack of low-cost drug options for patients who need 
medication.  Based on this evidence, reforming the regulatory process to 
prevent exploitation of the citizen petitions will yield sizable savings and 
benefits to the American public and government-sponsored insurance 
companies. 
EXHIBIT 1: COST TO SOCIETY OF DELAYING GENERICS DUE TO FOUR 
FRIVOLOUS CITIZEN PETITIONS 
 Total Cost Total Days Cost per Day 
Cost to Society, 
Overall 
$1.9 Billion 521 $3.6 Million 
Cost to Government 
Insurers Only 
$782 Million 521 $1.5 Million 
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EXHIBIT 2: LENGTH OF DELAY IN GENERICS REACHING THE MARKET DUE 
TO FOUR FRIVOLOUS CITIZEN PETITIONS 
Branded 
Drug 
Date 
Generic 
Drug filed 
to Enter 
Market 
Date Branded 
Drug Filed 
Citizen 
Petition 
Date FDA 
Denied 
Branded 
Drug’s Citizen 
Petition 
Date Generic 
Drug 
Application 
Approved by 
FDA 
Total Days 
Citizen 
Petition 
Filing 
Delayed the 
Generic Drug 
Plendila Jan. 2007 Nov. 30, 2007 Apr. 17, 2008 Apr. 17, 2008 139 
Altaceb Apr. 2004 May 16, 2008 June 18, 2008 June 18, 2008 33 
Seroquelc Apr. 2004 Sept. 9, 2011 Mar. 7, 2012 Mar. 27, 2012 200 
Zanaflexd Mar. 2007 Sept. 7, 2011 Feb. 3, 2012 Feb. 3, 2012 149 
    Total Days 
Delayed 
521 
a, b Prescribed to treat blood pressure. 
c Prescribed to treat depression. 
d Prescribed to treat muscle spasms. 
